The politics of mind reading: cartography and brain science in the discourse of medicine by Osbun, Joshua William
THE POLITICS OF MIND READING: 
CARTOGRAPHY AND BRAIN SCIENCE 
IN THE DISCOURSE OF MEDICINE 
A Seruor Honors Thesis 
by 
JOSHUA WILLIAM OSBUN 
Submitted to the Office of Honors Programs 
k Academic Scholarships 
Texas A&M University 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 
UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE 
RESEARCH FELLOWS 
April 2001 
Group: Humanities 
THE POLITICS OF MIND READING: 
CARTOGRAPHY AND BRAIN SCIENCE 
IN THE DISCOURSE OF MEDICINE 
A Senior Honors Thesis 
by 
JOSHUA WILLIAM OSBUN 
Submined to the Office of Honors Programs 
k Academic Scholarships 
Texas A&M University 
In partial fulfillment for the designation of 
UNIVERSIRTY UNDERGRADUATE 
RESEARCH FELLOW 
Approved as to style and content by: 
glas A. Brooks 
(Fellows Advisor) 
Edward A. Funkhouser 
(Executive Director) 
April 2001 
Group: Humanities 
ABSTRACT 
The Politics of Mind Reading 
Cartography and Brain Science 
In the Discourse of Medicine 
Joshua William Osbun 
Department of English 
Texas A%M University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. Douglas A. Brooks 
Department of English 
Medicine, like all other contemporary discourses, has a history. As such, medical 
discourse has been shaped by a wide range of ideologies in the long course of its 
development, and is open to criticism and analysis. In this sense, medicine may be 
perceived as an historical trajectory of texts which, like literary texts, demand a 
hermeneutic response. Philosopher Peter Machamer has observed that "the discovery 
and individuation of different entities and activities are important parts of scientific 
practice. In fact. much of the history of science has been written, albeit, unwittingly, by 
tracing the discoveries of new entities and activities that mark changes in the 
discipline. "' In this view. medicine can be studied by tracing the ideological changes that 
uncover its underlying rhetoric. I will follow this plan of action precisely in this thesis, 
for I will examine inany of the prominent texts in the history of brain science in order to 
examine the ideological changes in its discourse, and to show how the contemporary 
perception of the brain relates to earlier discursive perceptions. 
My reading of the trajectory of texts that make up the discourse of brain science 
uncovers an underlying notion of cartography in the writings. I am convinced that this 
discourse recycles itself in a continual effort to describe the physiological entity of the 
brain in a topographical fashion. This cartographical rhetoric, which begins as the 
dominating force of the discourse during the Renaissance, I v ould argue. arises out of 
the Western political ideology of the exploration and colonization of unchancd 
territories. If the body is perceived as an unexplored spatial region, then it is not 
unreasonable that science projects this pohtical ideology on its examination of the brain. 
Since the discourse has not altered its fundamental rhetoric in 500 years, I v, ould argue 
that there is no actual progress in the narrative of scientific evolution, but that there is 
rather a regression in the perception of metaphysical human identity. 
' Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl F. Craver. '"thinking About Mechanisms, " Philosophy of 
Science. (67 Mar. 2000: 1-25k p. 14. 
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1. Introduction 
Wtedicine, like all other contemporary discourses, has a history. As such, medical 
discourse has been shaped by a v. ide range of ideologies in the long course of its 
development, and Ls open to niticism and analysis. In this sense, medicine may be 
perceived as an historical trajectory of texts which. like literary texts. deniand a 
hermeneutic response. Philosopher Peter Machamer has observed that "the discovery 
and individuation of different entities and activities are important parts of scientific 
practice. In fact. much of the history of science has been written. albeit, unwittingly, by 
tracing the discovenes of new entities and activities that mark changes in the 
discipline. "' In this view, medicine can be studied by tracing the ideological changes that 
uncover its underlying rhetoric. I w ill follow this plan of action precisely in this thesis, 
for I v ill examine many of the prominent texts in the history of brain science in order to 
exantine the ideological changes in its discourse, and to show how the contemporary 
perception of the brain relates to earlier discursive perceptions. 
The discourse of brain science has its own rhetoric. one that is masked by a thick 
technical language: rather than being a discourse that is immune to criticism and 
analysis, it is charged v;ith many of the same thematic undertones as a literary text. By 
scrutinizing medical texts as such. I sense that they have significant connections to 
culture and society in their treatment of the human body and should be questioned about 
these characteristics. Michael Foucault. who has examined medical history from this 
standpoint, observes: 
For me it v, as a matter of saying this: If, concerning a science like 
theoretical physics or organic chemistry, one poses the problem of its 
relations v, ith the political and economic structures of society. isn't one 
posing an excessively complicated question? Doesn't this set the 
threshold of possible explanations impossibly high? But. on the other 
hand, if one takes a form of knowledge [savot'r] like psychiatry, won't the 
question be much easier to resolve, since the epistemological profile of 
psychiatry is linked w ith a whole range of institutions, economic 
requirements and political issues of social regulation? Couldn't the 
interweaving of effects of power and knowledge be grasped with greater 
certainty in the case of a science as "dubious" as psyctuatry? 2 
Here Foucault suggests that questioning the relationship of a pure science to social 
structure creates an impossible and complicated problem, but that imposing these 
questions on an applied practice such as psychiatry, or in my case brain science, creates 
an examination that is more easily grasped. In keeping with Foucault, I shall examine the 
epistemological profile of the brain in an attempt to demonstrate the level of power it 
exerts in the realm of medicine and culture by analyzing the rhetoric in which it is 
described. 
In my understanding of the discourse, the narrative of medical history tells a 
story of progress in order to convince society of its validity as a healing institution. I 
would argue. hov;ever, that the rhetoric behind medicine and especially brain science 
shows that (he discourse has continued in a circular fashion bv the manner in v;hich it 
examines the body. Foucault supports thLs reading of progress when he v;rites that 
It seems to me that in certain empirical forms of knowledge such as 
biology, political economy, psychiatry, medicine and so on. the rhythm of 
transformation doesn't follov, the smooth. continuist schemas of 
development which are normally accepted. The great biological image of 
a progressive maturation of science still underpins a good many historical 
analyses: it does not seem to me to be pertinent to history. ' 
Here Foucault argues that disciplines that tell smooth narratives of continual evolution 
are inconsistent with his reading of them. For Foucault this narrative of progress 
undermines other perceptions of history. Thus he suggests that progress is not important 
in historical discourse but rather that v orking ideologies of different time spans should 
be examined. With this perspective Foucault substantiates the historical analysis offered 
earlier by Machamer. Foucault continues his argument against progress: 
My problem v as. . to pose the question 'How is it that at certain 
moments and in certain orders of knowledge. there are these sudden take. — 
offs, these hastenings of evolution, these transformations which fail to 
correspond to the calm continuist image that is normally accredited'?*' 
But the important thing here is not that such changes can be rapid and 
extensive or, rather. it is that this extent and rapidity are only the sign of 
something else- a modification in the rules of formation of statements 
which are accepted as scientifically true. 
What Foucault is relating here is that the popular view of science tells a narrative of 
progression and maturation. He counters this narrative of medical history and indicates 
that the important issue at hand is the examination of the changes in which the discourse 
is presented as "scientifically true. " Expanding on Foucault's negation of progression in 
medicine. I v. ould offer that there is a lack of advancement because the discourse of 
brain science throughout its history has relied on a rather fixed biological and spatial 
rhetoric. 
My reading of the trajectory of texts that make up the discourse of brain science 
uncovers an underlying notion of cartography m the writings. I am convinced that this 
discourse recycles itself in a continual effort to describe the physiological entity of the 
brain in a topographical fashion. Even in the early writings of Greek physicians this 
ideology in the discourse is present. I notice in my reading that the method of 
cartography becomes markedly different in the Renaissance beginning with the theorist 
Andreas Vesalius, who detaches himself I'rom a metaphysical awareness of the body and 
seeks to describe the bodv in corporeal terms based on the structures he observes before 
him. I' ve found in mv analysis that the grounds of Vesalius' method of observation 
recycle themselves into the period of the scientific revolution and into the twentieth 
century, What is more, I' ve found in reading the texts of current neurological journals 
that I am able to locate this cartographic rhetoric in many of the abstracts I have read. 
While the language of the science presents itself in a way to convince the culture of its 
validity as a practice. I' ve discovered that beneath this exercise in public relations lies a 
reductionist notion of mapping the human brain. 
Observ ing the political history during the v ork of Vesalius, I notice that his 
research is paralleled by the discovery. exploration, colonization, and discovery of the 
Nev' World. I v, ould argue that the cartographical rhetoric in medicine is a projection of 
political ideologies. Howard Marchitello suggests that, 
The European discovery of the New World provoked the 
implementation of the systematic appropriation of the other on a virtually 
global scale- an act for which European states brought the full weight and 
power of their politicaL legaL an religious systems to bear, as all three 
worked first to make further encounter possible, and then to allow for the 
legal possessing of New World lands, people, and resources. ' 
Marchitello's view argues that the colonization of the New World consumed Western 
culture v:ith its "full weight and power. " If the body is perceived as one of the "others" 
that Marchitello v'rites of, then it would be subject to the same political rhetoric. As 
such, my reading of neurological literature is congruent v ith Marchitello's viewpoint 'm 
that the body was appropriated into sections, explored and colonized as an uncharted 
territory. Indeed, this is exactly what I have observed in discourses of brain science 
written since the Renaissance and therefore I intend to demonstrate this argument 
throughout this essay. 
Since the rhetoric of cartography continues to dominate the discourse, I would 
argue that there can be no progress in medical ideology when the grounds of its 
perception have not been fundamentally altered in 500 years. It is my intention in this 
essay to show that the notion of cartography dominates the rhetoric of neurological texts 
and that this dominance has caused the discourse to ignore its subject matter as 
something more than a physical object. As such, brain science in my opinion has 
abandoned those metaph) sical tenets that have troubled human beings since they began 
to think about thinking. In this sense, I u ould argue that the history of the discourse has 
regressed in the treatment of the human essence in an effort to prove itself as a valid 
practice. 
II. Hippocrates 
Through the course of medical history the name Hippocrates (460-361 BCE) has 
become synonymous with "Father of Medicine' (see fig, I). As the premier Greek 
physician. he wrote betvx een 50 and 70 medical texts. hying the foundation of Western 
medicine. Hippocratesrepresents a major turning point in medical thought as to the 
origin of disease. Before him medical theorists believed in a divine origin of disease 
where illness v, as brought on an individual who was impure in the eyes of the gods and 
could not be cured until he redeemed himself. Hippocrates believed rather in a natural 
causation of disease. thus taking the first physiological approach to medicine. 
More over. Hippocrates was the first physician to make assertions on the 
structure and function of the brain. He v as interested in its anatomy and physiology both 
in healthy and diseased states. He was the first to associate the function of the brain in 
relation to the rest of the body. In a work entitled On the Sacred Disease he writes, 
Men ought to know that from nothing else but the brain come 
joys, delights. laughter and sports, and sorrows, griefs, despondency, and 
lamentations. And by this, in an especial manner. v e acquire wisdom and 
knowledge, and see and hear and knov what are foul and what are fair, 
what are bad and ix hat are good, what are sweet and what are unsavory. . . 
And by the same organ we become mad and delirious, and fears and 
terrors assail us. . . . All these things v e endure from the brain, v;hen it is 
not healthy. . . . In these ways I am of the opinion that the brain exercises 
the greatest pow er in the man. This is the interpreter to us of those things 
which emanate from the air, v, hen the brain happens to be in a sound 
state. 7 
Taking the brain to be an organ of nature as such, Hippocrates diverges Rom his 
contemporaries, who believed that the heart was the organ of reason and that the brain 
served as a device to provide it v ith v armth. In the above passage, alternatively, 
Hippocrates clearly identifies abstract, intangible ideas such as "joys, delights. . . sorrows, 
and griefs" with a physical object- the brain. This assertion suggests that the emotional 
side of human nature resides w ithin something physical and tangible, an idea very 
radical in a society dominated by such a great supernatural realm as that of Ancient 
Greece. As one of the first philosophers/ scientists to study the human body objectively, 
he carries over this new school of thought to the specific case of epilepsy, which 
according to Greek culture v as a common sign of punishment Rom the gods. In the 
discourse of medicine, epilepsy had been the first and for many centuries the only 
disease studied affecting the brain, and so it becomes the focus of early attempts in 
describing brain science. In On the Sacred Disease Hippocrates challenges previous 
Vigure li "Kppocrates" from Magoer, Hisrory, p. 67 
notions and superstitions of epilepsy as what he terins a "sacred disease, " or one brought 
on by the gods. He makes the following argument for the natural cause of the ailment: 
I do not believe that the 'sacred disease' is any more divine or 
sacred than any other disease but, on the contrary, has specific 
characteristics and a definite cause. Nevertheless. because it is completely 
different Irom other diseases, it has been regarded divine visitation by 
those who, being only human, i iew it u ith ignorance and astonishment. 
This theory of divine origin, though supported by the difficulty of 
understanding the ntalady, is v eakened by the simplicity of the cure 
consisting merely of ritual practice and incantation. If remarkable features 
of the disease were evidence of divine visitation, there v, ould be many 
'sacred diseases. '. . . . It is my opinion that those who first called this 
disease 'sacred' v'ere the sort of people we now call v, itch doctors, faith- 
healers. quacks. and charlatans. These are exactly the people who pretend 
to be pious and to be particularly v ise, by invoking a divine element they 
v. ere able to screen their own failure to give suitable treatment and so 
called this a 'sacred' malady to conceal their ignorance of its nature. 
Here his writing exemplifies the change of thought he provokes in the specific case of 
epilepsy. He anempts to negate the argument of divine origin by associating its 
supporters, whom he calls 'witch-doctors. faith-healers, quacks and charlatans, " with 
their own inability to prescribe an effective treatment. For Hippocrates, questions of 
failed treatments should be remedied with further investigation, not by an assumption 
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that the disease is out of the scope of human reason. By setting this precedence, 
Hippocrates marks a change in the medical discipline where physicians begin to look 
beyond the supernatural factors effecting the human body and see it as a state of nature 
that can be nianipulated bv human touch. 
Hippocrates backs up his criticism of the origins of epilepsy by performing his 
own scientific research on the brain to propose his own theory of the disease's cause. He 
provides the following anatomical description of the brain: 
The human brain. as in the case of all other animals, is double: a 
thin membrane runs dov, n the middle and divides it. This is the reason 
why headache is not alv ays located in the same site but may be on either 
side or, sometimes. affects the v hole head. There are a large number of 
tenuous veins which extend to this structure &om all parts of the body. ' 
Hippocrates uses this description of the brain to suggest that epileptic symptoms may be 
caused when these vessels become blocked, for he believes that through these vessels 
one respires and thus the brain would be deprived of air. In this manner he uses his own 
investigation to provide an objectified causation for a bodily disorder. He also initiates a 
trend of mapping the brain, a practice that would be taken to new heights in the sixteenth 
century. And so in this way Hippocrates makes early efforts to describe the human brain, 
bringing a kind of scientific objectivity to medicine that differed fi'om the supernatural 
and spiritual theories of his predecessors. Hippocrates not only applies this logic to his 
study of the whole body. but also uses it to provide some more of his own insight into 
brain study. 
Similarly, Hippocrates is also interested in the cause and origins of dreams. 
seeking to find scientific explanations for them. In his study of dreams he maps the 
brain, associating certain areas with specific function. About the mind-body interaction 
which cause dreams, he observes 
Accurate know ledge about the signs v;hich occur in dreams will 
be found very valuable for all purposes. While the body is awake, the 
psxche is not under its ou n controL but is split into various portions each 
being devoted to some special bodily function such as hearing, vision, 
touch. locomotion and all the various actions of the body. But v hen the 
body is at rest. the psyche is stirred and roused and becomes its own 
master; the mind itself performs all the functions of the body. When the 
body is sleeping it receives no sensations but the psyche being awake at 
that time perceives everxxhing. ; it sees what is visible, it hears v, hat is 
audible, it walks, it touches. it feels pain and thinks. In short, during sleep 
the psyche performs all the functions of both body and mind. A correct 
appreciation of these things implies considerable wisdom. " 
Hippocrates thus sees dreams as an intersection between the body and mental health, 
Some dreams he believes to be healthy, as they are simply a transfection of a person' s 
daily thoughts and actions into the nocturnal psyche. Other dreams are contrary to 
daytime activity and these he believes to be a sign of bodily disturbance. And so he 
develops a Proto-Freudian notion of 'bad dreams" as a physical ailment relating to the 
brain. Hippocrates proposes that simply eating regularly and healthily and staying 
hydrated could cure this ailment, Thus he founds an early notion of brain science v'ith 
the first treatment for the mental disease nf nightmares. Further. he uses dreams as a 
means of proposing that certain areas of the brain are associated with certain functions, 
and writes that the brain is "split into various portions each being devoted to some 
special bodily function such as hearing. vision. touch, locomotion and all the various 
actions of the body, " Here Hippocrates again diverges radically f'rom his contemporaries 
v, hen he makes an ancmpt to niap the special areas of the brain. He continues on the 
subject of dreams to elucidate further observations and treatments: 
The facts about dreams are as follows: those that merely consist of 
a transference to the night of a person's daytime actions and thoughts 
v hich continue to happen in normal fashion just as they were done and 
thought during the day, are good for they indicate a healthy state. This is 
because the psyche remains true to its daytime coptations, and is 
overcoine neither by excess nor by emptiness. nor by any extraneous 
circumstance. But when dreams take on a character contrary to daytime 
activity and involve conflict or i ictory over them then they constitute a 
sign bodily disturbance. The seriousness of the conflict is an indication of 
the seriousness of the mischief. Now concerning this, I make no judgment 
whether or not to avert the consequence by appropriate rites or not. But 1 
do advise treatment of the body. for an excretion resulting from some 
bodily superfluity has disturbed the psvche. " 
Hippocrates' thinking here represents one of the first proposals of cause and treatment in 
brain science, and he asserts that "bad dreams. " those eliciting images outside of 
ordinary daily activity, are a sure sign of bodily disease. Although Hippocrates attributes 
their source to the body, he still maintains that brain symptoms are hnked to supernatural 
causes. In doing so his work suggests that even though he has provided a new way of 
examining the human body. he remains very connected to his cultural influence of 
religion. Having proposed a cause for the so-called bad dreams Hippocrates continues to 
propose a treatment, 
If the opposing force be strong, it is a good thing to pve an emetic and to 
administer a gradually increasing light diet for five days, to order 
I'requently earlv morning walks gradually becoming more brisk. and 
gymnastics for those accustomed to this form of exercise, proportionate in 
severity to the increase of diet. If the opposing force be weaker, dispense 
with the emetic, reduce the diet by a third and restore the cut by a gradual 
measure over five days. Strenuous v, alks and the use of vocal exercises 
will put an end to the disturbance. 
This proposed treatment for the brain disease of nightmares is a simple remedy 
for those afflicted. The remarkable fact about his proposed treatment, hov, ever, is 
that it resembles the advice of modern physicians. 
While the medicine of the body is slowly beginning to shift from the 
metaphysical to the physical during this period, the brain is still very much linked to 
mystical beliefs. Hippocrates shows this link in the treatment of bad dreams when he 
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emphasizes that v bile on the one hand he recommends treatment of the body, on the 
other he "makes no judgment v, hether or not you ought to avert the consequence by 
appropriates rites or not. " Hence. he can alleviate the symptoms, but he does not 
believe he can redeem the patient with the gods. The fact that he makes "no judgment" 
on the religious issue shows a separation of religion and medicine, and marking an 
alteration in medical thought, implies a division betv:een the priest and the medical 
practitioner. 
III. Galen 
Galen (130-200 A, C. E. j was a Greco-Roman medical philosopher who Iirst 
clarified notions of anatomy, physiology and therapeutics (see fig. 2). The hundreds of 
dissections he performed made him the authority on anatomical structure and circulatory 
physiology until the Renaissance. Like Hippocrates, Galen believed that disease was 
derived from nature but theorized that anatomy could answer larger philosophical 
questions such as the placement of the souL In thinking so. Galen's writings on the brain 
become a set of speculations on the mind-body-soul interaction rather than an objectified 
study of brain function and disease. While Galen's theoretical approaches are more 
evolved than Hippocrates in terms of modern notions of science, his theories on the brain 
are somev hat less medical and more philosophical in nature. 
Galen proposes that the "best doctor is also a philosopher, " and therefore "he 
must be practiced in logical theory in order to discover the nature of the body, the 
differences between diseases. and the indications as to treatment;. . . He must. therefore, 
»~ Magnet, Hisro~, p jap 
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know all parts of the philosophy: the logicaL the physicaL and the ethical. "' Galen takes 
his "philosophy" of medicine to propose that health is a combination of harmony 
between the mind, the body and the soul. He continues to stress objectivity in describing 
the body and natural origin of disease, but extends it to include spiritual and mental 
health, wherein his ideas on brain science become prevalent. In this sense, he is different 
from Hippocrates. v, ho rarely v rote of the spiritual nature of the body as combined with 
the physical. Galen belieies that there are three forms of the souL each housed in a 
certain organ. In this belief he offers a topography of spatial regions in the brain. The 
"rational soul" he identifies as being housed in the brain. Through his identification of 
the soul as residing in certain organs. Galen suggests a canographical approach to the 
body as well. His writing on the brain tends to describe theories based on observation 
rather than anatomical or physiological research. In another manner of speaking, Cralen 
is very similar to Hippocrates in that he spends much of his treatment of brain science on 
the subject of epilepsy. Galen and Hippocrates use epilepsy as the basis for the medical 
branch of brain science, largely because the disorder has such an observable nature. At 
this point in history, little could be done to determine the anatomical structure or 
physiological function of the brain, so Galen theorizes on the brain with what he can 
observe in the patient. Again, he tends to explain the brain in terms of a mind, body, soul 
relationship that is more spiritual than organic. Consequently. even 400 years after 
Hippocrates, brain science is still shaped by the stigma of a supernatural mystery. 
Galen was one of the first medical philosophers to begin to map out brain 
structure. He considers imagination, cognition, and memory as the basic components of 
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intellect. He acknov, ledges they could be affected independently, but at least in his 
known writings he stops short of actually localizing these faculties in different parts of 
the brain. Galen asserts that certain nerves in the brain served specific functions. He 
illustrates this concept writing that, 
In substance the encephalon is like the nerves, of v;hich it was 
meant to be the source. except that it is softer, and this was proper for a 
part that was to receive all sensations. form all images. and apprehend all 
ideas. For a substance easily altered is most suitable for such actions and 
affections, and a sof'ter substance is always more easily altered than one 
that is harder. This is the reason v, hy the encephalon is softer than the 
nerves, but since there must be two kinds of nerves. as I have said before. 
the encephalon itself was also given a twofold nature, that is, the anterior 
part &the cerebrum) is softer than he remaining hard part (the cerebellum), 
which is called encranium and parencephalis by anatomists. Now. . . the 
posterior part had to be harder, being the source of the hard nerves 
disuibuted to the v, hole body. 
In this passage Galen asserts his belief that the placement and texture of nerves is related 
to their function. By tracing the nerve route, he is able to make claims on what he 
believes to be their purpose. He also describes the physical texture of the surface of that 
v hich he observes. By speaking of both nerves routes and textures. Galen portrays a 
map of the physical surface of the brain. Thus he begins to make his own map of brain 
structure during the course of his methods of observation. 
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Galen is marked as the first physician to make observational, experimentaL and 
clinical contributions to cerebral localization. the mapping out of the control areas of the 
brain's cerebral cortex. He learns fiom his dissection experiments that the nerves 
conveying voluntary and motor power to the parts below the neck originate t'rom the 
spinal cord. to v'hich sensation and voluntary movement are signaled fi'om the brain. He 
makes the outstanding observation that the severing of the spinal cord results in loss of 
sensation and movement to all parts belov; the lesion. He also discovers that 
semisections would paralyze ipsilateral parts of the body belov: brain level. Galen seems 
fully aware that there exist two sets of nerves, sensory and motor. However, he cannot 
distinguish between the ventral and dorsal roots of the spinal cord and offers no 
explanation of their function. By tracing the location of certain nerve functions, 
hov'ever. Galen is able to propose that the brain controls sensation and voluntary motion, 
As such, he coins the term "apoplexy, " v hich he defines as the simultaneous loss of both 
sensory and motor nerve function. Furthering his pathological definitions. Galen terms 
localized apoplexy as paralysis of the specified region of the body, ' 
Galen continues to identify neurological pathologies by recognizing three forms 
of epilepsy based on the movement of the body during a secure. From this surveillance 
he attributes the nature of epilepsy solely to what he can observe and not to what he 
understands through experimentation, as he is able to with the rest of the body. He also 
describes mental health by monitoring emotional changes. He notices that melancholy 
and happiness may be brought on by stimuli affecting the body. These include such 
things as how hot or cold an individual is, how much alcohol he has consumed, how 
moist or dry he is, or v hether he has been having regular excretions. Thus. in (his sense 
Galen parallels Hippocrates, linking the body to the mind and brain. However. he further 
connects these entities to the soul. Galen describes the relationship between body and 
soul v'riting that, 
The souL like the physiological nature. is a kind of breath or 
pneuma, the pneuma of the soul being moister and colder, and that of the 
physis being dryer and warmer. Hence the pneuma is also a kind of 
matter proper to the souL u bile the form of that matter depends upon the 
proportionate mixing of the aerial and of the fiery substance. For it is not 
possible to say the soul is either air or fire alone. since an animal's body 
cannot become either absolutely cold or absolutely warm or even 
dominated bv one or the other in great excess: thus when the animal 
departs even to a small extent from symmetry. it becomes fevered if fire 
be in great excess, and chilled, livid and partly or entirely without feeling 
w hen air predominates: for this latter in itself is cold, but acquires a food 
temperament when mixed with the fiery element. 
In ibis passage Galen agrees with both Aristotle and Plato v hen he suggests that some 
disease and mental illness is an outward venting of a diseased soul. Yet he is very much 
concerned with the greater question of the brain's relationship to the soul man, what he 
believes to be the ate essence of man outside of the physical body. Thus on the subject 
of the brain, Galen seems to take a step away from anatomical research. This action is to 
be expected due to his limited ability to study the brain for structure and function. Even 
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if he had been able to do such research, the mechanisms behind brain function would be 
beyond the scope of his intellect and primitive understanding of human physiology. 
Thus, Galen leaves brain science remaining in the supernatural realm, and the early 
attempts at brain science tend to be based on observation and postulation. 
While Galen makes many early attempts to map structure and function in brain 
science, his view is still very clouded by religious sentiments. Medical historian Walther 
Riese describes Galen as "Aristotelian in his belief in a purposeful and v, ise organization 
of the living organism the description of v;hich, in Galenic terms, almost equaled a 
religious service with the admiration for the creator of the human body and its marvelous 
structure as an ever re-current theme. ' He is as much concerned with the "pneuma" 18 
and "spirutus" of the body and their location in the brain as he is with any anatomical or 
physiological entity he might discover. It was not until the Humanist movement that the 
medical ideologies become detached from religion. 
IV. The Move to Humanism 
In the period from 1450 to 1700, the Renaissance changed the arts, and the 
Scientific Revolution transformed ideas about the nature of the universe and the nature 
of man. The Greco-roman tradition was repktced by modern science and the seeds of this 
new mode of thought were phtnted by the work of the humanist scholars. The humanists 
were devoted to words and books and the difficult task of integrating experience and 
practice with classical learning. Their interests turned Irom heaven to earth. While 
humanist scholars v'ere generally more concerned with art and literature than science, 
then nev, perspective served the needs of the medical sciences as well. As staunch 
supporters of the newly purified Galenic texts. humanist scholars rejected corrupt 
medieval translations. However, their loyalty for ancient authorities made them skeptical 
of anempts to create a new medical science that v, ould be independent of the ancient 
regime. ' The humanists did not reject the ideas of the Greeks as Vesalius v;ould, but 
they mark an important move in studying medical science from a spiritual standpoint to 
one that is strictly corporeal. They were concerned only with what they could see v i(h 
an observant eye and did not care to make speculations on how their observations 
affected the nature of the human soul. This change m medical ideology marhs an 
imponant shift in the underlying rhetoric of medicine that, I would argue, changes ihe 
shape of medical literature through the present day. 
The critic C. D. O' Malley suggests that "mid-sixteenth century contests between 
Galenists, sworn supporters of Greek medical authority, and the anti-Galenist proponents 
of authority has sometimes been described as a kind of struggle between the forces of 
evil and good. betv, een smug conservatives and valianr progressives. *'" Although 
such a characterization of opposing forces as this may be correct for the ttud-sixteenth 
century, it by no means applies to the beginning of the century, when classical medicine 
was a progressive force seeking to enlighten the darkness of medievalism. "It was m 
consequence of that earlier conflict at the opening of the century, " argues O' Malley, 
'that the seeds of modern medicine were planted. developed as roots, and have remained 
partly embedded in the medicine of classical Greece. "' Henceforth some credit should 
be given to those physicians and humamsts who were first responsible for that recovery 
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of classical medicine. Their endeavor represents an adjustment in medical thought I'rom 
the Middle Ages, even though they were unaware that still further alteration in medical 
ideology v:as possible beyond the Greek contribution. 
O' Malley describes the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in the 
study of Greek texts as follows, 
The millennium and more from the fall of Rome to the dawn of 
modern times. during which Greek medical docile v as known in the 
West partially, indirectly, and even erroneously by way of Moslem 
interpreters and their medieval commentators, was a period of some 
stagnation and even retrogression in medicine; and there is a degree of 
truth in the belief of those late fifteenth and early sixteenth century 
physicians who declared that direct access to Hippocratic and Galenic 
writings v ould constitute the greatest possible boon to the medical art. . . 
Greek doctrine was diluted by medieval interpretation and medieval 
belief: terminology was badly confused; spurious v'ritings, notably those 
ascribed to Galen, falsified the Greek position, and, generally speaking, 
the rationaL scientific spirit of the Greeks was sacrificed. In some 
instances only fragments of works had been known through the medieval 
Latin translations, hence out of context, and still other Greek writings 
remained completely unknown except by title until, beginning at the close 
of the fifteenth century, they were studied for the first time in the original 
Greek and translated directly Irom that language into Latin. " 
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Here O' Malley suggests how the Humanists brought hack the ancient regime so that 
medicine could break out of the stagnation of criticism created by the Middle Ages, and 
physicians could reexamine the discipline 1'rom its last mark of notable transformation, 
Although the humanists refused to abandon the Greek tradition, they at least allowed 
medicine to regain its most advanced roots and to reevaluate its progress. Notable 
Medical Humanists such as Thomas Linacre and John Caius laid the foundation for such 
Renaissance medical theorists as Vesahus and Harvev to build on the Greek 
developments and revamp them into their ov n perception in ways that Middle Age 
physicians did not. Humanists also allowed for the radical notion of leaving behind the 
soul as it pertained to the body. This abandonment 1'reed anatomists to delve into the 
body in an objectified sense. As cartographers they mapped only what they saw and did 
not have to sketch the path of the abstract as did their predecessors. Thus, while the 
humanists did not advance the Greek tradition. they revived it for criticism and provided 
an avenue by v hich Renaissance physicians could explore other realms of knov, ledge 
regarding the body. 
V. Vesalius 
Andreas Vesalius was a Belgian anatomist and artist who lived Irom 1514 to 
1564. Lois Magner describes Vesalius' achievement, observing that "Just as Copernicus 
and Galileo revolutionized ideas about the motions of the earth and the heavens, Andreas 
Vesalius transformed Western concepts of the structure of the human body. " Vesalius 
was a member of the first group of scholars able to utilize the complete works of Galen 
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since the humanists had just revived them and translated them into Latin for the first 
time. As such. Vesalius viewed his own work as the first real advance in anatomical 
research since Galen's time. It is not unreasonable to say that his ideas began precisely 
v;here Galen's ended, and he was one of the first scholars who was permitted to use his 
classical knov, ledge to both publicly criticize and denounce the work of Galen. He 
himself realized he was breaking from the Galenic tradition. In his 1543 book Epitome, 
Vesalius asserts his turn fi'om the ancient regime: 
In saying these things I admit the innumerable tenets of Galen 
contradict me; such as that the anterior ventricles are the olfactory organs; 
that these ventricles gradually increasing in sofiness, end by constriction 
into the visual nerves; vet more strangely that these front ventricles emit 
phlegm into the nose. These and many other things of the kind are, I am 
convinced, learned rather I'rom copious discussion rather than 
dissection. ' 
Here it is clear that Vesalius is taking a different approach than did Hippocrates or 
Galen. thus setting forth a new tradition of medical discourse, one disassociated I'rom 
religion and obsessed with mapping the structures seen by the eye. 
What Vesalius comes to realize is that as Magner puts it, "human anatomy must 
be read fromthe 'Book of the Body, ' not fiom the pages of Galen. " It is interesting to 
note Magner's reference to the "Book of the Body" as Vesalius is the first anatomist to 
have his study of the body published in a printed book as he wrote approximately a 
century after the advent of the printing press. Vesalius' superior studies are derived I'rom 
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the fact that he has access to actual human bodies ~hereas Roman law prevented Galen 
from doing the same. In contrast to Galen, Vesalius has an agreement v, ith a judge in 
which executions are arranged around his schedule of dissections according to his need 
for specimens. Moving away Rom the precedent that Galen had set in medical approach, 
Vesalius points out where Galen v'as wrong in applying structure in apes to humans. In 
one instance he holds a lecture, pointing out 200 differences between the human and 
primate skeletons. V'ith such radical approaches Vesalius moves medical thought out of 
the period of medieval stagnation into a world of nev ideologies brought on by the 
Renaissance. 
Vesalius works on observation and dissection alone; he is completely 
uninterested in providing explanations for what he cannot directly witness and strives to 
be detached h. om any theological perceptions of the body. In this sense he becomes a 
true cartographer, tracing only the outline of the bodily landscape he can witness before 
him. In his Fabrica, for example. Vesalius negates the idea of a soul being located 
within the structures of the brain. writing 
All our contemporaries. so far as I can understand them deny to 
apes, dogs horses, sheep, cattle and other animals, the main powers of the 
Reigning Soul- not to speak of other (powers)- and attribute to man alone 
the faculty of reasoning; and ascribe this faculty in equal degree to all 
men. And yet we clearly see in dissecting that men do not excel those 
animals by (possessing) any special cavity (in the brain). Not only is the 
number (of ventricles) the same, but also all other things (in the brain) are 
similar, except only in size and in the complete consonance (of the parts) 
for virtue. 
From this excerpt it is clear that Vesalius differs fiom earlier Greek thinkers in that he 
feels the human brain is simply more cotnplex and capable than that of animals. He 
claims that since they are so similar in structure, animals by convention should possess a 
soul as weLL Based on v, hat he observes in the similarities between the animal and 
human brain. he deduces that if it is generally accepted that animals do not have a souL 
than humans definitely do not have a soul housed in the brain. With such conclusions, 
Vcsalius indicates that he is not concerned with the spiritual aspect of his v;ork. Walther 
Riese comments on Vesalius' detachment I'rom religious sentiments as well, noting the 
following observation by Vesalius: 
Can such a description of the uses of the ventricles (as it concerns the 
powers of the Reigning Soul) produce in ignorant minds not yet 
confronted in our Most Holy Religion? Such (ignorant ones) v'ill examine 
carefully (even though I myself were silent) the brains of quadrapeds. 
These closely resemble those of men in all their parts. Should we ascribe 
to these (beasts) every power of reason, and even a rational souL in the 
basis of such doctrines of the theologians? 
ln this passage, Vesalius' disinterest in religious sentiments is clear. He concerns himself 
only with that which he sees. If the theologians contend, "Blessed art those who hast not 
seen yet still believes. " then Vesalius is the unblessed individual who wants, as Othello 
puts it, the ocular proof. 
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Vesalius' work becomes the first real attempt to map the human body. While 
Hippocrates and Galen proposed efforts to provide a cartography of the body, he builds 
on their studies v, ith extensive exploration and drav ings. Moreover, his thorough 
dissection of the human brain provides w hat some critics argue is the first modern 
anatomical research in the field. Still further. he provides vivid descriptions to 
accompany the brain he draws, For instance in a top-view drawing of the brain he 
depicts the structures he exposes. noting 
In the third fibr u e have stripped off both membranes of the brain. that 
is, the thing and the duraL I'rom the entire portions lying above this 
section (v, hich we have made around the skull with a saw to display the 
brain). The process [falx cerbi] of the dural membrane separating the 
right portion of the brain I'rom the left, which is still preserved in position 
in the second figure. we have divided fiom the osseous septum [crista 
gali] which intervenes between the sinuses of the olfactory organs. This 
process we have left spread out over the left side of the human brain so 
that its shape might be examined, The portions of the brain on the right 
and left have been separated from one another manually so that the 
superior aspect of the corpus callosum presents itself for inspection. 
A and B indicate the left and right cerebral hemispheres; C the 
covolutions: D. the falx cerebri: E, the terminations of the severed cerebra 
veins; F, G, the inferior sagittal sinus; H, veins of the falx; I, K, internal 
cerebral veins at the beginning of the strait sinus: L, M, the corpus 
callosum; N. the crista galli; 0, pia-arachnoid; P, the dura (see fig. 3). 
In drawing and describing dissections as such, Vesalius offers a portrayal of structure to 
accompany the details of function that v ill eventually be theorized. Vesalius represents 
primitive ideas that can be associated with the thinking of the scientific revolution in the 
field of brain science with his anatomical studies. By providing a research-based 
structure of the human brain, he offers the notion of a brain science removed I'rom 
religious foundations. Thus Vesalius signifies a very important departure I'rom the field 
of brain science of his Greek contemporaries, for he views the body as nothing more 
than a physical form to be navigated and explored. 
VI. The Scientific Revolution 
The Scientific Revolution is generally thought of as the great transformation of 
the physical sciences during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries primarily brought 
about by such notaries as Copernicus, Galileo. and Newton. The popular viev; of 
medical history is that Harvey begins the scientific revolution in medicine with his work 
on the circulation of the blood. since continuing in the new ideologies of scientific 
thought he transforms medical research into an applied science that involves the 
discovery of mechanisms. I v'ould argue however, that the scientific revolution was not 
what pushed medicine, and especially neuroscience. to evolve into its contemporary 
advancement. but rather the change of medical thought spurred by the humanists and 
fully developed by Vesalius, that of the cartography of the human body. It is true that the 
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Figure 3: Vesalius' representatton of the cerebral gyTi, lrotn Suanders, lllusrron'ons, p ) tt9 
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scientific revolution is more fitting with the reasoning required to work out the body's 
physiological mechanisms, but I hope to show that the desire to understand function is 
driven by the earlier discovering of the structures that create the function. Hence it is 
humanist cartographers such as Vesalius that drive the desire to map the body as an 
unexplored microcosm. 
VII. Harvey 
William Harvey t1678-1657) served as a British Royal physician v, ho also 
diverged 1'rom the Galenic mold to add a new perception to physiological thought 
through his work on the heart and the circulation of the blood isee fig. 4). Harvey is the 
first to disprove Galen's theories on the heart and movement of bodily fluids through his 
simple but effective experimentation. Using arguments based on dissection, vivisection, 
and the works of Aristotle and Galen. Harvey agrees that in the adult all the blood must 
go through the lungs to get irom the right side to the left side of the heart. He theonzes 
that the heart is muscular and that its important movement is the contraction, rather than 
the dilation. His most radical idea. hov, ever, is that it is the beat of the heart that 
produces a continuous circular motion of blood. Moreover, he uses simple mathematics 
to estimate the aniount of blood pumped by the heart in an hour's time. Harvey's 
theories are very unique v hen compared with the long-standing and generally accepted 
tenets of Galenic medical thought. Therefore, Harvey's model causes most Galenic 
theory to be reworked. representing yet another change m the discourse of physiology 
This model was unacceptable to many scientists at the time, who had firm belief in the 
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Figure 4: Harvey's demonstratton of the ctrcnlation of the blood. taken f'rom Magner, Bisront p. 200, 
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Galenic tradition of medicine, and thus they question Harvey's accuracy. The real 
problem was that fev, others were able to understand Harvey's radical nev, theories let 
alone the implications and new questions that arose with them. And so they v, ere 
hesitant to abandon the old system. For some thinkers, new ideas about the movement of 
the blood. the respiration. and the distribution of the spirits were so painful that they 
tried to force them backwards into ancient Greek works with what modem science 
would consider remarkably convoluted arguments. Harvey changed medical thought in a 
manner that is unsurpassed by anyone else of his time. He uses the language of the 
scientific revolution in medicine to provide v, hat he believes is the concrete, quantitative 
data that proves his speculations and at the same time disproves previous perceptions. 
Even Harvey is aware of the radicalism of his ideas. In his famous work De Moru Cordis 
he writes 
Thus much of the transfusion of the blood out of the veins into the 
arteries, and hov it is disposed of and transmitted by the pulse of the 
heart, so some of which those perchance that were heretofore moved by 
the reasons of Galen, Columbus and others, will yield; now as concerning 
the abundance and increase of this blood, v'hich doth pass through those 
things which remain to be spoken of, though they be very considerable, 
yet when I shall mention them, they are so new and unheard of. that not 
only I fear mischief which may arrive to me from the envy of some 
persons, but I likewise doubt that every man almost will be my enemy, so 
much does custome and docile once retrieved and deeply rooted (as it 
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were another nature) prevail u ith every one, and the venerable reverence 
of antiquity enforces Ho~ soever. my resolution is now set down, my 
hope is in the candor of those which love truth, and learned spirits. 
In this excerpt Harvey recognizes that he connadicts Galenic theory and even feels that 
Galen and Columbus should -yield" to his ideas. In such an attitude. he portrays the 
movement of the time to abandon the old system for that of the new regime of scientific 
validity. In doing so, Harvey*s approach to medicine further severs it Irom its ties to the 
human spirit and the soul, and again the mapping of the physical body seems to be 
preferred over an effort to connect science to religious and philosophical sentiments of 
the body. 
From a scientific standpoint, medicine would now become more practical and 
sound, and'physicians would be able to further separate themselves as scientLsts, leaving 
their cultural perception as religious practitioners further behind. Magner suggests that 
medical progress v, as v idely needed, arguing that Harvey creates the real revohition in 
medical practice: 
Well aware of the revolutionary nature of his work, Harvey 
predicted that no one under 40 would understand it. His work constituted 
a revolution in science worthy of comparison to that launched by Isaac 
Newton. Although illness, age, and loss of precious materials and 
manuscripts during the English Civil War prevented Harvey from 
accomplishing all his goals, he did live to see his followers establish a 
new experimental physiology inspired by his ideas and methods. The 
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questions raised by Harvey's v, ork provided the "Oxford physiologists"— 
men such as Robert Bayle, Robert Hooke, Richard Lower, John Mayow, 
and Christopher Wren- with a new research program for attaining a better 
understanding of the workings of the human body. 
Here Magner relates that Harvey's work laid the foundation for a better understanding of 
the human body. However. Harvey is still concerned very much with mapping. so 
perhaps he merely continues the trend of Vesalius rather than revolutionizing the world 
of medicine. While Magner contends that Harvey transforms niedicine as a scientific 
practice, I v:ould argue that he rather remains stagnate and repeats the Vesalian trend to 
map the body. Instead of offering a radical new method of perceiving the circulatory 
system I suggest that Harvey enters into a circular thought process v. ith in his ov;n 
spatial study of the body. 
With his routing of the circulatory system Harvey continues the nend of mapping 
the body that dominated the medical historic tradition. While Harvey does not address 
the brain, he suggests an approach that helps his successors research their own mappings 
of the mind. Harvey's rhetoric can be seen in his description of how he came to deduce 
the circular motion of the blood. 
I began to bethink myself if it might not have a circular motion, 
which afterwards I found true, and that the blood was thrust forth and 
driven out of the heart by the arteries into the habite of the body and all 
parts of it. by the beating of the left ventricle of the heart. as it is driven to 
the lungs through the vena arteriosa by the beating of the right. and that it 
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does return through the little veins into the vena cava, and to the right ear 
of the heart. as likewise out of the lungs the aforesaid arteria venosa to the 
left ventricle, as we said before. ' 
Here Harvey traces the route of the blood from the heart to the lungs and back to the 
heart. His rhetoric seems to be more that of a topographer describing the pathway of a 
river rather than that of a scientist proving a complicated theory. Harvey continues his 
description, 
Which motion we may call circular, after the same manner that 
Aristotle sayes that there in and the air do imitate the motion o(the 
superior bodies. For the eanh being wet, evaporates by the heat of the 
Sun, and the vapours being raised aloft are condensed and descend in the 
showers and wet the ground, and by this means here are generated, 
likewise, tempests. and the beginnings of meteors, form the circular 
motion of the Sun and his approach and removaL' 
In this section, Harvey compares his map of the blood pathway to Aristotle's description 
of v, ater evaporation, which is done in terms of physical, Earthly entities. With this 
comparison, Harvey makes his depiction of blood flow even more geophysical in nature. 
He goes on to write that, 
So in all likelihood it comes to pass in the body, that all the parts 
are nourished. cherished, and quickened with blood, which is warm, 
perfect, vaporous, full of spirit, and, that I may so say, alimentative; in the 
parts the blood is refrigerated. coagulated, and made as it were barren, 
from thence it returtts to the heart. as fountain or dv'elling-house of the 
body. to recover its perfection, and it is mehed, and is dispensed again 
through the body f'rom thence, being l'raught v;ith spirits, as with balsam 
and that all the things do depend upon the motional pulsation of the 
heart. . . ' 
Here Harvey's portrayal is like a mother earth rejuvenating the life forms around her. 
IVith this underlying metaphor. Harvey again moves his description towards the earth, 
which has been so scrutinized by cartographers. Finally Harvey concludes his depiction 
of blood flow v;riting, 
Hence it is. seeing the veins are certain ways or vessels carrying 
the blood, there are two sorts of them, the Cava and the Aorta. Not by 
reason of the side. as Aristotle says, but by their function: and not. as it is 
commonly spoken. by their constitution, seeing in man Creature (as I 
have said) a vein differs not l'rom an artery in the thickness of the Tunicle, 
but by their use and employment distinguishable, a vein and an artery, 
both of them not undeservedly called veins by the Ancients, as Galen has 
observed, because that this, viz. the artery, is a way of carrying the blood 
form the heart into the habit of the body back again into the heart. This is 
the way from the heart, the other the to the heart, This contains blood 
rawish, unprofitable, and now made unfit for nutrition, the other blood 
digested, perfect, and alimentative. 
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Here Harvey displays his skills of deduction, combining the details of what he has 
observed through research to surnuse a working model for the circulation of the blood. 
Instead of questioning the inconsistencies of his findings with the Galenic tradition, he 
runs ivith them to devise by his standards a more realistic system. He even entertains the 
idea that his discoveries may be false, but has enough confidence in his research to 
challenge precedence. Harvey seems to very much parallel Vesalius and the humanist 
tradition in his writings. He too is concerned purely with the physical aspect of the 
human body and rather than completely throwing out Greek theories, he tries to build on 
them. In doing so Harvey sets a precedent for himself. that of taking the humanist vision 
into the scientific revolution. If critics argue that he sets the medical scientific revolution 
into motion, then it seems to me that he merely grafts the humanist method onto it, rather 
than changing the discourse himself. By establishing the mechanism by which the body 
functions under normal physiological conditions, he adds to the change brought on by 
the Renaissance to allow physicians Irom here on out to be able to address the 
abnormalities in the mechanism resulting in a diseased body. He does this by mapping 
not only structures he sees, but also the physiology he deduces. Thus I would argue that 
Harvey takes his own view on a trend begun by Vesalius by applying it to his own 
research. In the end he offers a different kind of mapping to further alter the discourse, 
for he applies this ideology to the motion of fluids in the body. Even though Harvey in 
my opinion does not alter the method of thutking behind the notion of mapping the body 
as a spatial region. he alters the discourse of medicine by offering a new structure to 
map, those regions of the body that are dynamic rather than static. 
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VIII. Thomas Willis 
Thomas Willis (1621-1675), an Oxford physician and disciple of the 
distinguished anatomist Jacobinus Sylvius, can be seen as Harvey's shadow in the field 
of neurology (see fig. 5). Willis v'rote the famous book Cerebri anarome in which he 
concerns himself cover to cover with brain function. In his book Willis proposes that the 
cerebral gyri controlled memory and the v, ill. He believes that imagination is a cerebral 
function rather than an intangible process, and he attributes it to the corpus callosum, 
which he broadly defines as the white matter of the hemispheres. Willis also calculates 
that the corpus striatum plays an important role in his scheme of the brain since he 
believes it controls sensation and movement. With associations such as these Willis is 
dedicated to linking brain structures to what he can deduce they regulate. In this sense 
Willis too is a cartographer in that he attempts to identify the spatial location of brain 
structures v'ith their function. In doing so he provides a more detailed model of brain 
regions. 
Bernard Hollander observes that 'Willis assigned to each particular part of the 
brain a special influence on the mind. " ' Willis connects voluntary motion with the 
cerebrum and involuntary motion with the cerebellum and disagrees v ith both Galen 
and Descartes when he decides for himself that the pineal gland is not in fact the seat of 
the soul but rather a lymphatic gland that has no relation to the substance of the brain. 
What interestingly makes him the true parallel to Harvey is that he traces the pathway of 
cranial blood vessels, of v, hich he terms their circular motion as the "Circle of Willis. " 
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Figure 5: "Thomas Viillis" from Finger. 
Origins, p. 23. 
Thus Willis can be seen as perceiving the brain in the same manner that Harvey 
perceives the circulatory system. 
Willis serves as an early exponent of an idea known as cortical localization, one 
that would become very prevalent in neurology in the nineteenth century. Cortical 
localization is the notion that the cerebral conex of the brain is made up of functionally 
distinct areas that each controls specific thought processes and brain operations. Willis 
begins this type of observation 150 years before its boom. The idea of cortical 
localization extends Vesalius' notion of the brain chart, and it can be reduced to an effort 
to create a more detailed map of spatial surface that lies before the neurologist. Willis 
creates the notion of cerebral localization and hence he also can be seen, like Harvey, as 
extending the Vesalian rhetoric to the brain. Willis too, in my opinion. does not invent a 
new form of viev, ing the body and the brain, for he applies bodily cartography to his 
own region of the body, What he does provide is the first attempt to locate the centers of 
brain functions as topographical regions and herein lies his contribution to the narrative 
of the discourse. 
IX. Rene Descartes 
Rene Descartes (1596-1650) was a very influential philosopher of the post- 
Renaissance period who also theorized on aspects of brain function. As a philosopher 
Descartes would naturally be concerned with more than just mere corporeal structure 
and function and thus he poses an interesting juxtaposition to thinkers of his day such as 
Harvey and Willis. Descartes believes that voluntary human behavior demands an 
interaction of the rational soul with the automaton. He maintains that this interaction 
occurs through the pineal gland. v, hich is a small body hanging between the anterior 
ventricles of the brain (see fig. 6h The pineal gland is a unique structure that has no 
bisymmetrical counterpart and for this reason Descartes ascribes it to be a likely seat for 
the soul. In doing so Descartes brings metaphysical entities back into the discussion of 
the physical regions of the brain. 
Descartes distinguishes very sharply between matter and spirit, defining the 
for&ner as extended substance and the latter as inextended thinking substance. Hollander 
explains that Descartes "held that (he v hole material world and all its processes were to 
be explained mechanically by means of the concepts of extension. divisibility and 
mobility. "' Accordingly, Descartes insists that a purely mechanical explanation of (he 
world must explain both the behavior of inorganic matter and the processes of organic 
bodies. He applies this argument to the body when he writes in Passions animae that 
All functions of the body follow naturally from the sole 
disposition of its organs, just in the same way that the movements of a 
clock or other self-acting machine or automaton follow I'rom (he 
arrangement of its weights and wheels. So that there is no reason on 
account of its functions to conceive that there exists in the body any soul, 
whether vegetative or sensitive, or any principle of movement other than 
the blood and its animal spirits agitated by the heat of the fire which 
burns continually in the heart, and which does not differ in nature fiom 
any of the other fires which are met with inanimate bodies. ' 
Figure 6t Descartes' representation of how light enters the eye and forms an image on the retina. Hollow 
nerves from the reuoa project the unage to the venuicles. The ptneal gland rhen releases the anunal sptrits 
into the motor nerves to produce motion. Taken from Finger, Origins, p. 26. 
Here Descartes armes that the purely mechanical justification of nature portrays a 
human figure devoid of a soul. Thus he feels his explanation for the working of the brain 
is superior since with his rationalization of the soul he can account for intangible 
energies such as emotions and thoughts, With this method of examination Descartes can 
be more closely linked to the Greek tradition. However. he uses the current conventions 
of his time to arrive at his conclusions, using a map of the body as a means to discover 
the souL 
Descartes' model of brain function is strikingly different irom his peers such as 
Willis, Rather than being purely mecharucal and materiaL his hypothesis centers on the 
body containing the souL which he believes to be the pineal gland. He elucidates his 
modeL writing that. 
This small gland (the pineal body), which is the principal seat of the soul, 
is suspended between the cavities containing these spirits in such a 
manner that it can be moved by them in as many different ways as there 
are sensible differences in objects: and at that same time, it can be moved 
in divers v, ays by the soul. Which is of such a nature that it receives as 
many different impressions within itself, or in other words, has as many 
different perceptions as there are different movements of the gland; and 
conversely, the bodily machine being moved in diverse ways by the soul 
or by any other cause, it impels the surrounding spirits towards the pores 
of the brain, through which they are conducted by the nerves into the 
muscles, by means of which the soul causes them to move our limbs. 38 
Descartes' modeL therefore. is a combination of the spiritual and physical body. This 
perspective becomes the only counterpoint of its time to his peers, who consider the 
body as a purely tangible entity, 
Where Harvey and Willis deal v ith the body m terms that can be objectified 
(movement. heartbeat, breathing), Descartes deals with the subjective products of the 
brain- the emotions. He defines six primary emotions which include wonder, love, joy, 
hatred. desire, and sadness. All other emotions he believes to be combinations of these 
six. Again in Passions animae Descartes observes 
The ultimate. immediate cause of the passions is merely the 
disturbance by v, hich the animal spirits set the small gland, which is in 
the middle of the brain. in motion. It is therefore an error to place the seat 
of the passions in the heart. No doubt the passions cause some 
disturbance to be felt in the heart, but this is through the medium of a 
small nerve which descends fi'om the brain to the heart. Passion depends 
so much on the machinery of the organism that a slight modification in 
the construction of the machine is enough to transform a passion. The 
same impression made on a gland by a terrifying object may arouse fear 
in some men, and excite courage and boldness in others; the reason of 
which is that all brains are not made alike, and that movement of the 
gland which excites fear in some, will in others cause the spirits to 
penetrate into the pores of the brain, whence they descend, some into the 
nerves through which move our hands in defense, and some into those 
45 
v;hich stir the blood and drive it to the heatt in the way required for the 
production of the spirits necessary to the continuance of this defense, and 
for the sustenance of will. 39 
From this passage we see a ftuther illustration of Descartes' union of the mechanical 
body and the ethereal soul. Emotions to Descartes are part of the soul unified with the 
physical body. More a philosopher than a physician, Descartes is able to diverge from 
his peers in an approach that is unpopular by scientific conventions of the time. 
Hollander observes that for Descartes 'the human body is an automatic machine in 
which ever&thing is explained by the laws of motion. To this machine a soul is joined, 
and what vvas mechanical in the body becomes passions in the soul. ' From this 
elucidation it seems clear that Descartes is concerned with more than what he can see, 
and strives to discover that v'hich he can feel with his own mind, a view very diverse 
f'rom the remainder of seventeenth century medical literature. 
Descartes' ideology on the perception of the brain can be examined as a trend 
following the Vesalian idea, but adding an age-old question for further analysis. 
Descartes too is a cartographer seeking discovery, but his quest differs vastly from other 
theorists. Because Descartes concerns himself with the ethereal essence of man as well 
as the corporeaL he suffers much criticism f'rom his scientific peers and successors. 
According to Riese, Descartes became the last to attempt to define the doctrine of the 
seat of the souL ' It is important to note that Descartes is renowned in the philosophical 
world but criticized in the scientific realm. The detachment of religious sentiment is still 
very pronounced in brain science methodology, and while Descartes in my opinion takes 
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the same approach to cartography, his critics are skeptical of its validity because of the 
nature of what he tries to accomplish. In this sense, the Humanist association with the 
Greeks seems to have been evacuated of philosophical notions. 
X. Phrenology 
Phrenologv is a nineteenth century philosophy founded by Josef Gafl in which 
knov ledge of different portions of the brain is used to compare the physical forms and 
magnitudes of the skull on different individuals with the propensities and intellectual 
powers that these individuals are found to actually possess (see fig. 7). Little is known of 
Gall's motives for c&&nstructing his science, but his scientific and anecdotal evidence 
flowed fiom his philosophical-social interests. Even before commencing his anatomical 
investigations he had set down his views on mind and matter, body, and souL in his first 
publication on the philosophy of medicine in 1791. Gall says of his motives: 
Although I had no preliminary knowledge, I was seized with the idea that 
the eyes thus formed u ere the mark of an excellent memory It was later 
only later on. . . . that I said to myself; if memory shows itself by a physical 
characteristic. why not the other faculties? And this gave me the first 
incentive for all my researches, and was the occasion for all my 
discoveries. 42 
It is apparent that Gall too concerns himself with the spatial arrangement of the brain and 
skull. As a cranial explorer, he even views it as a quest for what he terms 'discoveries. " 
Hence his work suggests that the Vesalian trend is still prevalent in the early nineteenth 
Figure 7: A phrenological diagram produced bv Johann Spurzheim. Takeo from Finger, Origins, p. 33. 
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century. On the one hand Gall rejects theories of the mind as independent fi om the brain; 
on the other, he asserts that experience is the only source for the contents of the mind 
and orgatuzation of thought; that is, he v as both anti-idealist and anti-sensationalist, 
According to James John Garth Wilkinson, 
Gall came out of the cerebral welk and looking upon the surface 
found that it was a landscape. inhabited by human natures and in a 
thousand tents. all dwelling according to passions, faculties and powers. 
So much was gained by the first man v ho came to the surface, where 
nature speaks by representation: but it is lost again at the point u herc 
cerebral anatomy begins. 
Wilkinson's description of Gall's v'ork suggests that Gall is at once concerned with the 
spatial landscape of the brain and with its relationship to the philosophical rhetoric of the 
soul. In this sense, Gall can be seen as more closely associated with the Greek discourse. 
Nevertheless. he still combines the Greek question of the mind-soul relationship w ith the 
more recent idea of brain cartography. 
From this perspective, phrenology takes a step backwards in the popular view of 
the evolution of scientific deduction while taking a step forward in unveiling the 
mysteries of the brain. Phrenology speculates on subjective data of behavior associated 
with the objective measurements of the skull to come to physical conclusions as to the 
state of an individual's mental health. According to the narrative of most critics of 
history. this methodology causes the revolutionary discourse of the Renaissance to be 
abandoned for a return to speculation. Phrenology does, however, change brain science 
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in that it is the first significant attempt to map brain function to location, perhaps 
gesturing at the mechanisms of mental thought process. For the first time since the early 
anempts by Galen. phrenology seeks to understand the relevance of structure. So instead 
of creating stagnation in the field, I would argue that phrenology poses the idea of 
associating the working map of spatial location v;ith the mysteries ofbrain function. It 
also revives an ancient idea of the place of the soul within the discourse, a question that 
had been forgotten for several centuries. 
lvfany medical historians take the view that phrenology failed as a bunk science 
but at the same time taught scientists to stick v'ith research-based and quantified data 
when making valid assertions. Herein they believe lays the value of phrenology. Roger 
Cooter explains that, 
Phrenology is a readily accessible example of knowledge patently 
flawed by extrascientific factors and, therefore, able to be contrasted with 
real science. Circularly, by referring to correct science, an explanation is 
thought to be had for incorrect science. But in fact, dogmaticaHy 
explaining phrenology as incorrect science or pseudoscience renders not 
an explanation of past belief in it, but rather an accumulation of scientistic 
capital to be expended in furthering the image of modern science and its 
practitioners as divested of social and ideological interests. 
Portraying the narrative of scientific advancement. Cooter argues for an inaccuracy in 
phrenology according to the modern scientific standard of validity. Nevertheless, he too 
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fails to see phrenology's connections to both the Greek and humanist perspectives. In a 
similar fashion, Foucault suggests that there is much value in an historical error, 
Truth is undoubtedlv the sort of error that cannot be ref'uted 
because it was hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking 
process of history. Moreover, the question of truth, the right it 
appropriates to refute error and oppose itself to appearance, the manner in 
which it developed . . . does this not form a history, the history of an error 
we call truth? 
What Cooter and Foucault suggest is that in the errors of phrenology, science found a 
truth in objectified research. It reaffirmed the ineffectiveness of medical speculation and 
gave further support to the science of medicine. With results based on that v;hich could 
be quantified, patients ivere more likely to trust the methodology of the physician. Even 
though they write phrenology off as a pseudo-scientific failure, historians contend it 
posed the medical questions in brain science that, unexplained by speculation, would 
begin to be answered and mapped out by subsequent 20 century research. 
Conversely. I would assert that the birth of phrenology is rather the product of a 
change in the discourse with another underlying agenda, one that has its roots in the 
Greco-Roman era, v'hen physicians sought to answer spiritual questions about the mind 
and body v bile treating disease. If phrenology sought to question the purpose of 
structure as an attempt to understand the total being, then I suggest it makes an attempt 
to examine the nature of the body in a manner unpopular to science at its time. 
Specificaliy, phrenology is in my opinion a significam attempt to create a map of the 
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brain and this in my view links phrenology to Vesalius as well. So rather than existing as 
a bunk science, phrenology marks a nev' way of examining the brain that combines both 
classical and humanist ideas. What is more, Gall's ideas come at the birth of a period of 
cortical localization. While many argue that Gall's work resulted in a failed science. he 
is still considered to have sparked the idea that certain regions of the brain are associated 
with specific functions. It is Gall's method of mapping the regions of the mind, I would 
argue. that becomes the protocol for cortical localization in the nineteenth century. 
XL 19' Centurv Cortical Localization 
As defined earlier. cortical localization is the notion that the cerebral cortex is 
composed of functionally distinct areas, which consequently demands of neurologists an 
effort to seek out these. areas and identify them. Nineteenth century English philosopher 
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) represents a shift in neurological thought from that of 
phrenology to a more corporeal study of the brain where localization of function is 
emphasized over metaphvsical production of shape. Spencer himself begins his career as 
an avid phrenologist and then later denounces phrenology in order to examine the brain 
fiom the perspective of phvsical psychology. Hollander describes Spencer's v ork as 
"the first psychology v, ithout a soul, " suggesting Spencer's move away from the 
metaphysical investigations of the brain, Spencer is a strong advocate for cortical 
localization and comments, 
No physiologist. . . . Can long resist the conviction that different 
parts of the cerebrum subserve different kinds of mental action, 
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Localization of function is the law of all organization whatever: 
separateness of duty is universally accompanied with separateness of 
structure and it would be marvelous were an exception to exist in the 
cerebral hemispheres. ' 
In Spencer's account, different entities perform different duties and for this reason it is 
only natural in the manners of organization to dissect the brain in this fashion. And this 
is exactly what the nineteenth century did to the brain. Many famous neurologists of this 
period still leave their mark as great explorers behind as the names of structures 
neuroscientists use today. 
One of the first discoveries performed in the century v;as the locating of the 
speech articulation area in the Irontal lobe of the brain. The nineteenth century 
neurologist Paul Broca will be forever remembered as marking "Broca's area' as the site 
of language production in the frontal lobe. His study of frontal lobe aphasia was what 
allov ed him to make the discovery. The entitling of functional structures v, ith the names 
of their respective discovers becomes a nev" trend in the nineteenth century (see fig. 8). 
In this sense, the brain scientists of this period are like explorers who discover and 
colonize areas of unexplored land and name what they find after themselves. Looking at 
the trends of political colonization during this period, I would argue that neurology 
follows the same thought process on the brain as governments do on territory. Cases 
such as that of Phineas Gage, the man whose his skull was pierced by a tamping iron 
heing projected through his fiontal lobe by a blast, serve as accidental phenomena to 
support Broca's effort to localize this function. The effects of Gage's injury provide 
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Figure 8: Brodmann's drawing of the brain with different cortexes labeled. Taken trom Finger, Origins, p. 
42. 
evidence to validate Broca's discovery and allow him to further stake his claim to the 
area of the brain he identifies. 
The German neuroscientists Edward Hitzig and Gustav Fritsch are generally 
credited v:ith their discovery of the motor cortex in the brain. The two experimented on 
the brains of dogs to come to their conclusions. Collaborating on their research they 
conclude; 
A part of the convexity of the hemisphere of the brain is motor, another 
part is not motor. The motor part. in general is more in I'ront, the non- 
motor part more behind. By electrical stimulation of the motor part, one 
obtains combined muscular contractions of the opposite side of the body. 
These muscle contractions can be localized on certain very narrow 
delimited groups by using very weak currents. . . . The possibility to 
stimulate narrowly delimited groups of muscles is restricted to very small 
loci which we shall call centers. 
The language of Hitzig and Fritsch is very cartographic in nature. They identify some 
areas as effecting motor function and some as effecting sensory function. The two 
neurologists use terms such as 'foci" and "centers" to pinpoint the exact location of 
regions they describe. This diction is congruent with the theme of exploration and 
discovery in the texts of the period. Hitzig and Fritsch localize areas and discover new 
ones by affecting the familiar ones. In doing so they reduce Vesalius' dissection of the 
whole body to a small scale, providing perhaps a more detailed map of a specific organ. 
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The trend of cortical localization continues through the century where the 
underlying rhetoric of a master brain map remains possible to uncover. The neurologists 
Jan Purkinje and Theodor Schv ann explore the electrical network of the brain and the 
body in an effort to map it. These tv o scientists also leave their names on the structures 
they discovered, for in neuro-anatomy the terms "Schwann cell" and "Purkinje fiber" 
appear. By the twentieth century any remnants of Descartes' question of the 
philosophical mind are completely ignored for the discovery of new areas performing 
new functions. The modern map of the brain is rapidly being traced. Stepping out of the 
body to examine the w orld, the latter part of the nineteenth century sees extensive 
European colonization and exploration both in India and Africa. At the same time, the 
American West is at its peak of exploration, discovery, and division as land is divided up 
into smaller settlements named after their founders. Connecting these observations in 
both brain science and politics, I would argue that the same rhetoric governs both 
discourses. Hence, the driving rhetoric behind medicine becomes cartography and 
exploration rather than progress. 
The twentieth century in neurology is a conglomeration of hundreds of 
neuroscientists working in the same manners as the scientists of the nineteenth century. 
There are far too many figures with minor discoveries to thoroughly analyze their 
individual writings. Up to the present day, the brain continues to be divided into smaller 
spatial arrangements with more specific functions. Each area has been explored. 
catalogued, and placed on the map in the most detailed description possible. A 
columniation of such ideological treatment of the brain has produced the current 
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v;orking model, I suspect that the twentieth century has not changed its perception of the 
brain and that I can uncover a similar rhetoric to what I have found in texts through the 
nineteenth century. In the remainder of this essay, I intend to argue that the current state 
of the art in the discourse of brain science is strongly linked to its past in both ideology 
and rhetoric. 
XII. Mechanisms 
The current status of neurology is a field consumed by providing thoroughly 
researched mechanisms for the brain* s most minute functions. In providing such 
mechanisms, scientists refine the working map of the brain, reducing it to smaller and 
smaller areas each with its own precise purpose. Indeed the contemporary state of the 
field strives to further define the structures it has discovered since the Renaissance in 
such a way that each intricacy of neurological structure and function is located to the 
smallest and most precisely accurate unit of space. By examining the discourse as such, 
we can assess the imbedded rhetoric of the current discourse. The writings of critics such 
as Peter Machamer, u ho suggests that mechanisms can be broken down into ontic, 
descriptive, and epistemic characteristics. demonstrate the modern equivalent of the 
Vesalian ideology of brain cartography. Characterizing mechanisms in this manner 
answers the question of "why" scientists have pursued such approaches. After 
mechanisms have been examined for their philosophical rhetoric, they can be placed 
back into the historical trajectory of brain science. 
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In a recent essay entitled 'Thinking About Mechanisms, " Peter Machamer, 
Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver discuss the rhetoric behind scientific mechanisms, I 
want to examine their method briefly as a means of demonstrating how to give evidence 
for my argument of current efforts to explore the brain as an uncharted territory. 
According to these theorists, mechanisms can be broken down into ontic. descriptive, 
and epistemic qualities. Linking these processes back into a historical trajectory, they 
comment that "The discoverv and individuation of different entities and activities are 
important parts of scientific practice. In fact, much of the history of science has been 
well written. albeit unwittingly. by tracing the discoveries of new entities and activities 
that mark the changes in a discipline. " For Machamer et al, science generates its 
historical discourse fiom linking the state of the art to key changes in its past ideologies. 
Usmg this method the underlying rhetoric of modern brain science can be shown as 
recycling itself in historical change. 
The argument of Machamer, Darden, and Craver is that a mechanism can be 
analyzed as having a rhetoric that uses certain features to validate its model. However, 
this rhetoric can be broken down to uncover certain other thematic elements in the 
discourse, and as previously elucidated, can show how these elements relate to the 
historical trajectory. Their argument portrays the reductionist theory behind science and 
hov science divides its subject matter into smaller and smaller units of scrutiny. I intend 
to argue that through a reading based on the ideas of Machamer et al, I can weed through 
the epistemology of the discourse and demonstrate the cartographic rhetoric in current 
journal art ic les. 
At this point I want to pause in my narration of mechanisms to define some terms 
relating to the philosophical examination of scientific rhetoric. A "mechanism" can be 
defined as a proposed model for the way in which an organic process occurs. A basic 
mechanism is composed of "entities" and "activities. ' An "entity" can be thought of as 
any physical structure that has been recognized as existing as a concrete object. 
Conversely, an "activity' is an action or process carried out by an entity. We can define 
mechanisms by their ontic. descriptive, and epistemic characters. The ontic character of 
a mechanism is what defines its state of being or existence, namely the entities that 
comprise the mechanism. The descriptive character of a mechanism, its descriptive 
adequacy, is the manner in which the mechanism is represented. perhaps by textual 
analysis or a diagram exhibiting spatial relations and structural features. The descriptive 
character is the method by which the scientific rhetoric elucidates the relationship 
between entities and activities. In my argument. this characteristic is the cartographic 
depiction of scientific process. Finally, the epistemic adequacy of a mechanism is the 
basis of its knowledge, how it is presented as a scientific truth. The epistemic character 
of a mechanism is the nianner in v'hich it is portrayed as intelligible as the actual way a 
process occurs. First I v ill discuss the method by which these characteristics can be 
employed to study the rhetoric of a mechanism. 
The first quality of mechanisms is derived Rom its ontic character, v'hat defines 
its state of being as existing. By attributing mechanisms with an ontic adequacy, we are 
attempting to capture the healthy philosophical intuitions underlying both substantivalist 
and process ontologies. Substantivalists, those who emphasize the independent nature of 
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a mechanism. confine their attention to entities and properties, believing that it is 
possible to reduce talk of activities to talk of properties and their transitions. In contrast, 
process ontologists, those who view a mechanism as dependent on other processes, reify 
activities and attempt to reduce entities to processes. By combining the two arguments a 
mechanism can become ontically adequate by endowing it with both entities and 
activities. As Machamer et al put it. 'The organization of these entities and activities 
determines the v ays in which they produce the phenomenon. Entities often must be 
appropriately located. structured. and oriented, and the activities in which they engage 
must have a temporal order, rate and duration. " In other words, a mechanism is the 50 
series of activities of entities that brings about the completion or termination of a 
condition in a regular way. Hence mechanisms portray the way in which a bodily 
function occurs I'rom its start to its finish. Machamer et al conclude "No philosophical 
work is done by positing some further thing, a law, that underwrites the productivity of 
activities, " and adds that "In sum, we are dualists: both entities and activities constitute 
mechanisms. "' Machamer's reference to a "law" governing the workings of a 
mechanism echoes Spencer's notion of the law or legality that drives localization and his 
argument here suggests that no single underlying rule can explain the rhetoric behind 
mechanisms and that one must examine the elements of the process to determine its 
rhetoric. Therefore, both defining and examining the entities and activities coinprising a 
mechanism can provide an ontic state provided for any scientific function. 
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A descriptive adequacy can be attributed to mechanisms as well. Since 
mechanisms are very abstract in nature, a means of depicting them as concrete is 
necessary. Machamer et al elucidate. 
Descriptions of mechanisms begin with idealized descriptions of the start 
or set-up conditions. These conditions may be the result of prior 
processes. but scientists typically idealize them into static time slices 
taken as the beginning of the mechanism. The start or set up conditions 
include the relevant entities and their properties. Structural properties, 
special relations, and orientations are often crucial for showing how the 
entities v ill be able to carry out the activities comprising the first stage of 
the mechanism. 52 
In their viev' scientists fix the game of mechanisms; they "idealize'* them in description 
so as to v:ork according to theory. Breaking the description of mechanisms into "time 
slices" parallels the notion of changing ideologies in the historical trajectory. Thus, in 
the current state of the art historical thought processes repeat themselves. 
Although the intermediate activities may be divided into stages in the operation 
of a mechanism they are more accurately viewed as continuous processes. Mechanisms 
occur in nested hierarchies and the descriptions of mechanisms in brain science are 
I'requently multi-level. Machamer et al argue that "nested hierarchical descriptions of 
mechanisms typically bottom out in lowest level mechanisms. These are the components 
that are accepted as relatively fundamental or taken to be unproblematic for the purposes 
of a given scientist. research group, or field. " Hence, bottoming out is relative; different , 53 
types of entities and activities are v, here a given field stops when constructing 
mechanisms. Documenting such new entities and activities allows us to map out the 
changes that become the substance of the history of science. Machamer et al once again 
provide the connection of modern mechanisms to their history when they conclude their 
explanation of descriptive adequacy by writing 
The history of these changes implies that what count as acceptable 
types of entities. activities, and mechanism change with time. At different 
historical moments, in different fields, different mechanisms, entities, and 
activities have been discovered and accepted. The set of types of entities 
and activities so far discovered is likely not yet complete. Further 
developments in science will lead the discovery of additional ones. 
Finally, mechanisms are provided with an epistemic adequacy, their ability to 
make logical sense. The contemporary mechanical worldview, among other things, is a 
conviction about how phenomena are to be understood. Activities are essential for 
rendering phenomena intelligible. The intelligibility consists in the mechanisms being 
portrayed in terms of a field's bottom out entities and activities. Machamer et al once 
again elaborate on this point pving the example of protein synthesis: 
The understanding provided by a mechanistic explanation may be correct 
or incorrect. Either may, the explanation renders a phenomenon 
intelligible. Mechanism descriptions show how possibly, how plausibly, 
or how actually things work. Intelligibility arises nor from an 
explanation's correctness, but rather fiom an elucidative relation between 
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the explanans (the set up conditions and intermediate entities and 
activities) and the explandum (the termination condition or the 
phenomenon to be explained). Protein synthesis can be elucidated by 
reference to Gamow holes. The ability of nerves to conduct signals can be 
rendered intelligible by reference to their internal vibrations. 'Aeither of 
these explanations is correct: yet each provides inte)iigibility by showing 
how the phenomena might possibly be produced. 
In this view, descriptions of mechanisms render the end-stage intelligible by showing 
how it is produced by bottom out entities and activities. Making mechanisms logical 
allows them to be more likely to be accepted as concrete scientific processes and not just 
idle suggestions. 
Machamer et al also reste epistenuc adequacy to history, observing that 
There is no logical story to be told about hov, these bonom out 
activities, these kinds of production. come to inhabit a privileged 
explanatory position. What is taken to be intelligible (and the different 
ways of making things intelligible) changes over time as different fields 
v, ithin science bottom out their descriptions of mechanisms in different 
entities and activities that are taken as, or have come to be, 
unproblematic. This suggests quite plausibly that intelligibility is 
historically constituted and disciplinarily relative (which is nonetheless 
consistent with there being universal general characteristics of 
intelligibility). 
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As they v rite here. Machamer et al take the viewpoint that scientists tend to break things 
down to their most reduced state so as to present its subject matter in a logical sense The 
theorists suggest that the manner in which they do this changes through the historical 
trajectory of a discourse and thus their manner of representing their subject requires 
some further examination. Following with the trend of reduction Machamer et al speak 
of, I ivould argue that the brain map is the underlving rhetoric that drives brain science to 
reduce its representation of the brain to its most localized spatial portrayals. By viewing 
the modern literature in this manner, I hope to demonstrate how a similar examination 
can uncover the cartographic project in the current state of the discourse 
XIII. Contemporary Maps of the Brain 
In this section of the thesis I examine several examples of current medical journal 
articles relating to the field of neurology in order to assess the extent to which they rely 
on rhetorics of cartography. These articles, which have been pulled I'rom the most 
respected journals in the field of neurology, continue (o show a number of the 
ideological perceptions of Vesalius. 
In a recent issue of the neurological journal Brain (2000k an article entitled 
"Accelerated Forgetting in Patients with Epilepsy: Evidence for an impairment in 
Memory Consolidation" contains a summary that reads 
Patients v ith epilepsy frequently complain of memory difficuhies 
yet perform normally on standard neuropsychological tests of memory. It 
has been suggested that this may be due to an impairment of very long- 
term memory consolidation processes, beyond those normally assessed in 
the neuropsychological clinic. 
From the opening lines the summary of this article explains that insight into the disorder 
of memory loss in epilepsy patients will begin with the discovery of sites of memory 
consolidation. Hence, memory sites will be located based on impairment. The method of 
studying epilepsy is thus based in mapping out locations of memory. The authors 
continue the summari to discuss their method of research: 
We carried out a prospective study of verbal memory over a long term 
retention interval of eight v, eeks in patients with epilepsy and in controls. 
Results v ere compared with performance on conventional tests of 
memory. Despite normal learning retention over 30 minutes, patients with 
epileptic foci in the left temporal lobe performed disproportionately 
poorly on the long-term test compared with patients with epileptic foci in 
the right temporal lobe and controls. Our findings provide evidence for an 
extended period of memory consolidation and point to the critical region 
for this process, at least for verbal material. in the left temporal lobe. The 
implications of our findings for clinical assessment and therapeutic 
management of patients with epilepsy are discussed. 57 
This summary describes the results of a group of scientists who performed memory tests 
on patients with known areas of epileptic foci in so that they can correlate areas of 
epilepsy in the brain v, ith areas of memory storage. While the article appears to be the 
report of findings for memory loss in epilepsy patients, it can be examined for an 
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underlying rhetoric of brain cartography, Uses of terms such as "foci" and 
'consolidation" implv a localization of the entities they are discussing. The researchers 
have already discovered areas of epilepsy on their map of the patients' brain and now 
they are using this discovery to explore more areas were they hope to locate memory 
storage. Thus v'hile the summary seems to be about the side effects of a neurological 
disease, it also becomes an attempt to locate further sites of memory in the brain. Again 
the narrative of progress is seen here, for the article appears to be about the advancement 
of knowledge regarding epilepsy. However, the rhetoric I have unveiled shows that the 
method of research for this advancement is based on a cartography of memory, and the 
Vesalian perspective can still be observed in a contemporary medical finding. 
Cartographic notions can also be observed in a recent issue of the journal Brain 
and Language. One particular article, entitled "Interhemispheric Effects of Simulated 
Lesions in a Neural Model of Single-Word Reading, *' concerns itself with the neural 
structure involved in language processing, The abstract of this article reads 
A neural model consisting of paired cerebral hemispheric regions 
interacting via homotopic callosal connections v'as trained to generate 
pronunciations for 50 monosyllabic v ords. Lateralization of this task 
occurred readily when different underlying cortical asymmetries were 
present. Following simulated cortical lesions of systematically varied 
sizes. acute changes in the distribution of cortical activation were found 
to be most consistent with experimental data when interhemispheric 
interactions were assumed to be excitatory. During subsequent recovery, 
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the contribution of the unlesioned hemispheric region to perfonnance 
improvement v, as a function of both the amount of preexisting 
lateralization and the side and size of the lesion. These results are 
discussed in the context of unresolved issues concerning the mechanisms 
underlying language lateralization, the nature of interhemispheric 
interactions, and the role of the non-dominant hemisphere in recovery 
from adult aphasia. ' 
This abstract deals v ith language production resulting from the various interactions of 
different areas of the brain. The author explains that experiments were perforined to 
study the effect of language production when these areas of interaction were subjected to 
lesions. Notions of spatial identification are very present in the abstract. The researchers 
speak of "lateralizat ion" and 'cortical asymmetries, " which again portray an image of 
the spatial construction of the brain. Since the article discusses the interaction of the 
region in the mechanism of language production, another image of roads, pathways, and 
arrows showing the network of locations is also depicted beneath the scientific jargon. In 
the images produced by the article's descriptive adequacy arises the image of a map of 
all these entities connected by their functional activities. Thus the same rhetoric is at 
work here. that of depicting a map in order to portray a scientific process. 
This kind of cartographical imagery is once more observed in a February 2001 
issue of Neurology in an article by the title "The Functional A. atomy of Gaze-Evoked 
Tinnitus and Sustained Lateral Gaze. " I would like to break the abstract into sections for 
analysis. The first section reads: 
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Objective: To identify neural sites associated with gaze-evoked 
tinnitus (GETR an unusual condition that may follow cerebellar-pontine 
angle surgery. Merhods: The authors examined eight patients with GET 
and used PET to map the neural sites activated by lateral gaze in them 
and seven age- and sex-matched control subjects. 
The objective and methods of this article are concerned with "sites" of GET, which the 
authors intend "to map. ' 
Venule 
the article is concerned v'ith a neurological condition, 
the rhetoric immediately reveals that it is unconsciously concerned with a cartography of 
locations. The abstract continues, providing the experimental results: 
Results: In patients with Get, tinnitus loudness and pitch increased with 
lateral gaze and, to a lesser extent, up and down gaze, Evidence for neural 
activity related to GET was seen in the auditory lateral pontine 
tegmentum or auditory cortex. GET-associated nystagmus appears to 
activate the cuneus and cerebellar vermis. These sites were found in 
addition to an extensive network that included fi ontal eye fields and other 
sites in f'rontaL parietal, and temporal cortex that were activated by lateral 
gaze in seven control subjects and the patients. The unilateral deafness in 
patients v'ith GET was associated with expansion of auditory cortical 
areas responsive to tones delivered to the good ear. In addition to GET, 
unilateral deafness. end-gaze nystagmus, and facial nerve dysfunction 
were common. 
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Here the authors observe GET "sites" among certain structures of the brain. They 
describe location with diction such as 'frontal, " "temporal, " and "parietaL" which orient 
us on the map of the brain, so that we may perceive the location of the condition. The 
abstract of the study concludes: 
Conclusions: Patients v ith GET have plastic changes in multiple neural 
systenrs that allov, neural activity associated with eye movement. 
including those associated with the neural integrator, to stimulate the 
auditory system. Anomalous auditory activation is enhanced by rhe 
failure of cross-modal inhibition to suppress auditory cortical activity. 
The time course for the development of GET suggests that it may be due 
to multiple mechanisms. 59 
In this abstract, neurologists study the effects a condition known as GET on hearing after 
a certain brain surgery v'as performed. The entire abstract is consumed with pin pointing 
the 'neural sites'* that are affected in a region of the brain known as the auditory cortex. 
So once again v, 'bile the article appears to be engulfed in scientific discussion on an 
unusual disorder, the cartographic elements of the disorder's components are still 
witnessed. 
XIV. Conclusions 
Throughout the course of my readings of texts in the historical trajectory of brain 
science I have uncovered an underlying rhetoric of canography behind the mask of the 
thick scientific style. While the obvious rhetoric of the discourse is one that attempts to 
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validate the practice of physicians, I v, ould argue that the driving rhetoric is rather one of 
recycling an effort to reduce the working map of the brain as a spatial region. When 
countering the narrative of progress that the palpable rhetoric suggests, the question of 
v'here the unconscious rhetoric is derived I'rom arises. I would contend that. based on 
v'here I find the physicaL cartographical rhetoric to originate, I can argue historical and 
cultural influences that drive the underlying rhetoric. Since I begin to observe the 
rhetoric as detached I'rom metaphysical sentiments commencing with Vesalius, I v;ould 
offer that it is driven bv the start of colonization in the West at the time of Vesalius' 
research on the human body. If nations sought to explore and map out the nev, regions of 
land that they discovered, then it is not unreasonable that medicine would treat the body 
in the same fashion. Because of this parallel in discovery, brain science seeks to manage 
the brain as an unexplored spatial region as well and thus continually strives to refine the 
map of its subject matter to the most reduced detail. 
The age of exploration, both in regards to the universe and to the body, continues 
in the present day. The regions of space beyond Earth remain yet to be fully explored 
and fully understood and therefore humans persist in their attempts to obtain a greater 
knov'ledge of location. In the same sense, science still has not explained the full function 
of the brain and much is yet to be understood. Indeed, the brain is capable of vast 
operations for which modern science has still not provided a map of the functional 
netv ork. Until a satisfactory map of the brain is traced, the discourse will continue to 
present its work as a progression in the understanding of the body's most physically and 
metaphysically complex organ. 
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Since I have contended that the cartographical rhetoric of the discourse has 
resulted in the recycling of perceptions and the negation of progress, I would suggest 
that the discourse can progress through a new rhetoric, perhaps one that incorporates the 
metaphysical. When viewing the brain in its dual role as the human mind, in can be 
perceived in several more contexts than a complex network of structures and control 
mechanisms for the body. Contemporary neurophilosopher Thomas Szasz suggests the 
pov, er of those who throughout history claimed to understand the mind from a 
metaphysical standpoint. 
Before long, the tendency toward role-specialization, inherent in 
the social nature of human life, led to certain persons becoming 
accredited as experts in understanding Man ipsyche, soul, mind). The first 
authorities. called "priests. " were soon followed by philosophers and 
playwrights. From antiquity until the end of eighteenth century, the 
members of these three groups v'ere the acknowledged experts on human 
nature. Attributed to divine sources, the authority of the priesthood v as 
unquestioned and unquestionable and was inseparable l'rom the authority 
of the "state" (as the executive arm of the "church"). 
Here Szasz suggests that the authoritative power in the understanding of the essence of 
man resided v'ithin those who could understand the human psyche, soul, and mind. They 
were the "experts on human nature" who had "unquestionable" authority and insight into 
the individual person. Szasz continues to show the shift of power regarding human 
nature, contending that 
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Today, the familiar psychoanalytic psychobabble, parading as 
psychological science. is being refurbished v«ith so called 
neurophilosophical accounts of mind-as-brain. As a result, the study of 
man as a moral agent becaine 'unscientific" and unfashionable and was 
replaced by the "scientific' study of man as (mental) patient whose 
behavior is determined by the chemicals in his brain and the genes in his 
body. The moral-philosopher thus ceded his mandate to the expert in 
neuro-science: respect, justice, and the rule of law v;ere replaced by 
compassion. tort litigation, and medical ethics: and the Welfare state v, as 
absorbed into the Therapeutic State. 
Szasz narrates that there was a shift from the philosophical perception of the brain to one 
that was dominated by scientific practice. No longer was the brain described in "moral" 
terms as its perception became consumed by the rhetoric of valid medical practice. Szasz 
agrees that this shift results in regression and does not support the abandonment of the 
metaphysical discernment of the brain. He argues that 
Not surprisingly, the results still fall short of Utopia. It is one 
thing to understand the structure of DNA or control a dog in a kenneL It 
is a very different thing to understand human behavior, much less control 
a person possessing the rights in a society ostensibly committed to 
respecting "human rights. ' As I show, the modern expert's inability or 
unwillingness to concede this difference is regularly accompanied by his 
inability or unv'illingness to acknowledge the conceptual primacy of the 
72 
person as a moral agent (that is. the cognitive absurdity and moral 
impropriety of reducing a person to his body or mind or soul). ' 
Here Szasz concludes his argument by criticizing the neuroscientist as unwilling to 
recognize the individual, and his brain, as having a metaphysical character. For Szasz, 
this 'inability" to consider the person as having a "moral agent" leads to an inability to 
understand human nature. Thus, because the modern scientist rejects the philosophical 
view of the brain, his rhetoric of validity fails in that it is unable to consider the non- 
corporeal side of the body. I would offer, in accordance with Szasz, that what the 
discourse of brain science cannot explain about its subject resides in the metaphysical 
character of the mind. 
While critics such as Szasz suggest that the modern rhetoric of science fails to 
progress because of the manner in which it ignores the supernatural aspects of the body, 
other critics comment on the relationship of the image of the disease in society. Along 
with locating the structures of the brain, the medical discourse also identifies disease of 
the brain. The diagnosis and description of brain disease poses yet another set of 
questions to be addressed in culture. Those individuals afflicted with such disorders play 
a complicated role because of the manner in which they are perceived in society. In one 
sense, the cultural image of the mentally diseased can be viewed as yet another depiction 
of the brain map, for it is an image of malformed structure. The image of brain disease is 
a map that steps out of the body and away f'rom reduction to view the overall form of the 
body. The critic Sander Gilman observes that 
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Thus the relationship betv, een images of disease and the 
representation of intemalized feelings of disorder is very close, In this 
matrix the references to collapse (or to the needed sense of control) draw 
upon the historical pattern of the images found within aesthetic traditions. 
A free play exists betv'een the uses of these images- whether they are 
altered and reproduced as vLsual images. incorporated as descriptive 
devices or metaphors in texts, or v, hether their presence haunts the 
presuppositions of "scientific" nosologies used in medical classification. 63 
Here Gilman suggests that the image of a disorder in society is closely linked to the 
internal emotions of the afflicted (see fig. 9). Thus, the aesthetics of disease depiction 
have incorporated themselves into many components of culture- art, literary metaphors, 
and of course scientific classification. Hence the outer map of the diseased body creates 
several complications that science tends to ignore when it reduces the whole picture of 
the brain into minute locations. Gilman observes these social complications in the 
imaging of brain disease: 
Yet each presentation reflects the social constraints and implications of 
the medium selected. We can turn to those paradigmatic shifts in the 
history of imaging disease- to the Renaissance rediscovering of the body, 
for example, or the professionalization of the treatment of the mentally ill 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries- and see how 
clearly contradictory icons of the patient exist simultaneously within 
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certain images. Leonardo and Freud thus have much more in common 
than one would, on first glance, suppose! 
Gilman suggests that the imaging of the outv:ard effects of the brain on the body is an 
important historical marker. In considering the brain from this perspective, one can 
examine the question of how the treatment of the brain as a physical object is projected 
onto the patient affected by its dysfunction. So not only does Gfiman offer the possibility 
that the social hnage of the mentally ill is yet another product of the cartographical 
rhetoric but that it implies nev' sociological considerations in the treatment of the patient 
as the same type of physical object to be scrutinized as the brain. 
By extending my reading of both Szasz and Gilman, I would argue (hat their 
criticisms suggest that the brain can be perceived in several more rhetorics than science 
is willing to examine. The discourse of brain science ignores questions of the mind that 
have troubled philosophers. theologians, and even medical theorists for thousands of 
years. The human race has alv ays contended that man is more than a corporeal 
substance. and that he is made of an ethereal matter that is on one the hand perceptible 
but on the other hand intangible and difficult to comprehend. When neurology attempts 
to explain the metaphysical nature of man, it does so through the terms of physical 
entities and activities. It explains emotion, thought, memory, and sensation in terms of 
chemical signals and electrical stimuli, I would argue that the metaphysical cannot be 
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explained by reducing it to the physical. Nevertheless, science has attempted to describe 
the mind in precisely such terms. 
The brain is at the intersection of the physical and metaphysical realms of the 
human body. Hence, there is more of the brain to be examined than mere physical 
structure and function. The narrative of progress in brain science tends to be moving in a 
direction where knou ledge of the corporeal attempts to manipulate the ethereal and 
spiritual side of man. In the not-too-distant future the discourse predicts it will be able to 
read the biochemical sequences of memory and thought production. perhaps reducing 
human thought to an objective practice. Once the map of the brain, by scientific 
standards, is complete. neurologists can theorize that all disorders derived from the brain 
can be manipulated and cured. The problem with these disorders is that they stem from a 
part of being that is greater than physical substance. In the manipulation of emotions and 
thought processes, personal identity is manipulated as well. If this feat is accomplished, 
then science strips man of any spiritual foundation. In this sense a the progression of 
scientific knowledge results in the regression of human identity. 
I would argue that the circular rhetoric of neurology that I have suggested will 
prevent brain science from achieving metaphysical controL While the physical and 
metaphysical realms intersect, one cannot control the other. Since I have argued that the 
recycling of the cartographic rhetoric has resulted in a halt of progress in the discourse, I 
am convinced that this lack of progress will eventually catch up with the discourse. This 
occurrence will force the discourse to examine its subject matter Irom new perspectives 
and then perhaps it can advance as an ideology. 
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Examining the texts of neurology I'rom a literary and philosophical standpoint, I 
have gained much insight into a field that I intend to enter into in the near future. As I 
was developing my argument, I found myself unable to describe the discourse without 
using its own cartographic language. In my first drafts, I also found myself attempting to 
narrate the historical trajectory as a progression in medicine. Having observed myself 
write and think in such a manner, I realized, as Foucault v:ould suggest. the 
inconmuencies in the historical narrative of medical progress. When I induced that the 
texts recvcled themselves in the same rhetoric, I came to understand how current 
medical views are i ery detached fiom individuals. A living body is inhabited by a 
metaphysical entity and this cannot be ignored in medical practice. 
What this study has taught me is that as a physician I v'ant to gaze beyond the 
physical body of the patient lying before me and concern myself both with treating the 
ailment and with treating the patient's being. In educating myself on the writings of 
philosophical doctors such as Hippocrates and Descartes, I' ve come to hold the 
metaphysical aspects of the human body in higher importance. I' ve decided that a 
physician succeeds by synthesizing both physical locations in the body with their 
metaphysical counterparts elsewhere. 
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